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Abstract. Today Samsung is the world leader in flat screen TV and cell phone sales. LG is second in TV sales, fifth 
in cellphones. Samsung fabricated its first LCD screen in 1995, well after such screens already dominated laptop 
computers, and had shipped its first cell phone only in 1988. LG wasn’t even founded until 1958 when it started its 
development of the first Korean-made radios. By 1982 it shipped its first color TV – made in the USA. In this time 
frame, not even twenty years ago, TV shipments were dominated by Japanese consumer manufacturers and cell 
phones were led by Motorola and Nokia. This paper explores possible sources of the secret to the Koreans’ success 
and finds that the usual metrics – in particular patents, R&D investment, and low cost labor – don’t explain it. We 
speculate that “industrial policy” measures of the South Korean government may have been decisive. 
 
Historical Context.  
In 1945, World War II ended. Japan was devastated, with most of its cities in ruins and its economy 
literally a “basket case”. Korea was almost as bad, as a former Japanese colony, and about to get worse 
with the North Korean invasion, followed by the UN “Police Action” and the subsequent Chinese 
invasion. Ironically, the Korean War was a catalyst for Japan’s recovery, as Japan became the pillar of the 
American war effort. As Japan revived, South Korea was ravaged by war. By the middle fifties, Korea was 
in no better shape than Japan had been ten years earlier, except it was further troubled by a series of 
autocratic dictatorships. Japan further benefitted from being viewed by the US as an anticommunist 
bastion, on which aid and other benefits were lavished2
The advances discussed below are all in the context of recovery from the destruction of these wars. The 
Korean War did not “end” until 1953, while Japan had surrendered only eight years earlier. With that 
head start and the US investment during the Korean War the Japanese electronics industry was able to 
charge into the post-war 20th century with few obstacles. Not only did Korea start later, but the Korean 
economy was smaller and less advanced than the Japanese – of which it had, of course, been a part until 
1945. The European and US electronics makers, being the winners, were not driven by the same 
necessity to overcome adversity. 
. Korea, in contrast, was a footnote in the cold 
war, mostly characterized by the continued armed confrontation at the 38th parallel. It was a virtual 
stepchild of American foreign and economic policy.  
Evolution of the TV Industry 
In 2013 sales of TV sets – now, virtually all liquid crystal technology-- are dominated by Samsung and LG, 
Korean companies who until this century were bit players in the world of consumer electronics.  
                                                          
1 Senior Vice President, Fairfield Resources International, Inc., Darien, CT and Adjunct Professor, Columbia Business School 
2 See, for example, http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/log-sup/log-sup.htm and 
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/log-sup/japan.htm  
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Twenty-five years ago one would have been forgiven if they had not noticed these now electronics 
giants. In those years the leading TV makers – then, of course, using cathode ray tube (CRT) technology – 
were in Japan, a magnet for “out-sourced manufacturing” thanks to their skill at high volume low cost 
techniques. Sony, with what we would now recognize as an Apple-like reputation for quality (and 
prices), Sanyo, Panasonic, Toshiba and Hitachi, conglomerates selling everything from nuclear reactors 
to washing machines, and Sharp, which was about to bet the farm and its whole business on liquid 
crystal TV sets. Loitering in the wings were the surviving European makers, Philips, Telefunken, Siemens 
and others, barely more than brands even then. Perhaps the most striking change was the recent 
announcement that Samsung will “invest” in Sharp, one of its key suppliers – essentially a bailout. And 




And the US? Already a hollow giant, with many famous brands like RCA attached to foreign-made boxes 
thanks to the lower costs promised in the Far East, where “the foothills of the Himalayas” were already 
a major source of anything with significant labor content. The Americans had evidently gambled that 
they could survive with their knowledge-based engineering talent, oblivious to the near certainty that 
there were plenty of smart engineers in China (as there had been in Japan decades earlier) who would, 
sooner or later, take over the higher value-added parts of the value chain and leave the US to sell and 
service the machines that the ships from China were busy unloading.  
Was this transition inevitable? How, in fact, did it happen?  Here are some thoughts, starting with LCD 
flat panel TV sets. 
                                                          
3 http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4373507/Will-Japan--Inc--say-Sayonara-to-TV-manufacture- 
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Evolution of TV Technology 
Television itself is, conceptually, at least, 100 years old, with the first US commercial broadcasts (for 
minimal audiences, of course) transmitted shortly before World War II. However, “The first 
commercially made electronic television sets with cathode ray tubes were manufactured by Telefunken 
in Germany in 1934, followed by other makers in France (1936), Britain (1936), and America (1938). The 
cheapest of the pre-World War II factory-made American sets, a 1938 image-only model with a 3-inch 
(8 cm) screen, cost $125, the equivalent of $1,863 in 2007. The cheapest model with a 12-inch (30 cm) 
screen was $445 ($6,633).”4
Although the military need for advanced technology did not diminish after 1945 – indeed, the cold war 
provided a continuing source of development money – TV technology was energized in the 1960’s. After 
RCA had made the then-daring gamble to introduce color TV, teletype-based computer terminals were 
rapidly replaced by CRT terminals. This was an application which the US TV makers appear to have 
completely missed. IBM, the industry leader, developed and manufactured its own displays (eventually 
moving both development and manufacturing to Japan by the 1980’s). This was partly because in those 
years IBM did everything in-house and partly because TV technology was not mature enough to deliver 
the needed quality for a computer display, in spite of their superficial similarities. The move to 
manufacturing in Japan was, again, motivated by the allure of high volume low cost manufacturing. 
 The war interrupted the growth of commercial TV, but the technology itself 
was rapidly accelerated by the military need for reliable electronics and (as in radar and sonar) high 
quality displays. The basics of a CRT TV set are relatively simple for an engineer to master (“not rocket 
science”) and apart from incremental enhancements a TV set was little more than a commodity, 
distinguished from its competitors by cost, quality, industrial design, and brand recognition.  
However, the computer display business had an important side effect. Not being dominated by the 
traditional consumer electronics brands, any company could dive in and develop a line of “plug-
compatible” monitors. Limited by their fragmented computer industry, no Japanese computer company 
had the volume, much less the vision, to dominate the field. What they did have was cadres of engineers 
who spent a great deal of energy researching alternatives to CRT-based TV sets. Although liquid crystal 
displays were slowly emerging, if only in displays more suited to watches and calculators, what initially 
appeared to be the major technology candidate to replace the CRT was the AC plasma display, originally 
invented at the University of Illinois in 1964 and seriously commercialized in the early 1970’s by IBM in a 
banking terminal display.5
The plasma display technology had a good run, greatly extended when engineers were able to produce a 
full color display by adding phosphors to the panel’s cells. Not an easy technology to master, the major 




                                                          
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_television#Television_sets 
 Most of the other Japanese TV makers avoided major investments into this new 
technology, although Samsung and LG did invest, and look like they will be the only survivors for a few 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plasma_display 
6 See, for example http://www.avsforum.com/t/1463886/panasonic-may-end-plasma-production-in-2014  and 
http://mashable.com/2012/05/11/panasonic-plasma-tv/  
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more years7
What has become the ubiquitous TV display technology – indeed, virtually the only viable contemporary 
TV display technology – is the digital liquid crystal display.
. Other alternatives did not fare nearly as well, although clever engineers regularly 
showcased the newest technology at the annual “Display Week” show of the Society for Information 
Display. Faced with the barrier of a potentially huge investment if they were to compete with the LCDs, 
however, each of these hot technologies soon faded, like a roman candle. 
8 LC-based displays first emerged –slowly – in 
the 1960s when RCA (!), which led the way, demonstrated mini LC displays, using new materials from 
the German Merck.9
Even as late as 1993 the first issue of Information Display, the Journal of the Society for Information 
Display (SID) had several articles on advances in CRT technology, along with articles on various LCD 
competitors such as ferroelectrics in addition to several papers on LCD technology.
 The first RCA patent [3,322,485] was filed in 1962 and issued in 1967. By the early 
1980’s, virtually every Japanese consumer electronics maker had a group dabbling in the technology. 
One can speculate that LG did, too – Samsung hadn’t even filed a patent and only released its first 
(B&W) TV set in 1980. Even IBM kept its hand in. By 1985, prototypes with a diagonal measurement of 
the order of 10 inches – not competitive for a TV but perfect for a portable (laptop) computer -- were 
being shown at the SID meetings. By the early 1990’s, the IBM-Toshiba partnership, Display 
Technologies, Inc., was one of the top three makers of liquid crystal displays. 
10
The technology involved was intrinsically far more complex than CRTs. The devices were in fact far more 
like giant integrated circuits than TV sets and the manufacturing skills involved were a challenge to 
everyone – but well suited to companies that had been making ICs. Making displays at a competitive 
cost involved processing a large plate of glass (actually anticipated by the glass used at the start of a 
plasma display line) with the transistors that drive the pixels of the display deposited by expensive tools 
in a production line that would soon cost billions of dollars. Today’s LCD manufacturing lines process 
plates of glass the size of a garage door. Few people can afford one of these giant panels, but the key to 
a competitive cost structure is processing the largest possible sheet of glass, from which smaller panels 
can be cut. This was long seen as the key to reducing semiconductor cost, in that the larger a wafer 
being processed, the more chips could be produced in a single process. Recognition of this truism, 
however, was not enough – management had to take the risk of making multibillion dollar investments. 
Samsung and LG did. 
 . The field was 
open even then, although the articles reporting advances in LC technology strongly indicated where the 
industry was headed. 
As challenging as the LCD technology was, it had one virtue in comparison with CRT-based TVs. No one 
had a head start on building the factory or the displays. The Japanese, of course, had extensive 
experience in IC manufacturing, greatly facilitated by the government’s catch-up industry policy 
                                                          
7 Information Display, Mar/Apr 2013, page 3. 
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liquid_crystal_display 
9 [See, for example, History Crystallized: A First-Person Account of the Development of Matrix-Addressed LCDs for television at RCA in the 
1960s” http://www.informationdisplay.org/article.cfm?year=2008&issue=01&file=art7.] 
10 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jsid.1993.1.issue-1/issuetoc 
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stimulus11
Samsung and LG 
, and all the Japanese computer makers had IC manufacturing capability with large and 
growing patent portfolios. Sooner or later, they all developed in-house LCD capability, with Sharp 
making the most aggressive strategic choice in the early 1990’s. Samsung was also well positioned to 
make LCD’s, as it was already the world’s leading maker of DRAMs. 
Although founded in 1938, it was not until the late 1960’s that the Samsung Group entered into the 
electronics industry when it formed several electronics-related divisions. Its first TV product was a black-
and-white television set. In 1980 Samsung entered the telecommunications hardware industry with 
telephone switchboards and Samsung Electronics began to invest heavily in research and development, 
investments that were evidently key in pushing the company to leadership of the global electronics 
industry. Samsung became the largest producer of memory chips in the world in 1992, and is the world's 
second-largest chipmaker after Intel.12 liquid-crystal display  Not until 1995 did it create its first  screen. 
The field was already dominated by patented technologies, almost none of which were Samsung’s. Ten 
years later, Samsung had grown to be the world's largest manufacturer of liquid-crystal display panels. 
Indeed, its current share exceeds that of the three leading Japanese brands combined. 
Samsung had earlier made a strategic decision to go into the DRAM business – even then almost a 
commodity13 - and by 1992 Samsung was already the world leader in the manufacture of memory 
chips14
Samsung had followed the DRAM path when it moved into making hard disk drives, again paying for the 
many needed patent licenses until its internal R&D gave it patent parity. By 2010 it had achieved a 10% 
global market share but, reflecting a focus on the bottom line, sold the disk business to Seagate for 
$1.4B in 2011.
. This success in the face of even stronger adverse patent positions no doubt encouraged 
Samsung to challenge other technologies where it would have to make substantial payments for needed 
patent licenses. Staked by a government eager to catch up with and surpass the Japanese, capital was 
not a problem and the Korean home market was protected as the Japanese market had been earlier. 
Even patents were brushed off. When sued for infringement, Samsung just paid – but, meanwhile, 
making huge R&D investments so that the next time around they would have enough patents of their 
own to reduce or eliminate royalty payments.  
15
The government’s deep pockets no doubt made building factories easy – and they didn’t have to worry 
about public investors complaining about return on investment, at least in the US, since Samsung is still 
not listed on a US exchange. In contrast, IBM and Toshiba abandoned their ambitions to become major 
  The model clearly worked, and it is not hard to see the logic in adopting it to move into 
LCDs – particularly since the LCD technology in the late 1990s was still emerging, and leadership was still 
in contention. 
                                                          
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_policy_of_Japan  
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LCD makers circa 1993 when the price tag for the next generation fab approached $2B16
By 2012 Samsung led worldwide sales with a dominant 26% share; LG was second with a 14.6% share 
and Sony third with a 9.5% share. Surprisingly, the sales of “US-based” Vizio
. Samsung 
gained the #1 position worldwide in 2007. 
17
AmTran Technology
 virtually equaled Samsung 
in the US. However, Vizio is hardly a US manufacturer, other than its headquarters and a South Dakota 
call center: “Vizio's major partner in the consumer electronics arena is , a Taiwan-
based OEM/ODM that manufactures more than half of the televisions sold by Vizio and owns a 23% 
stake in the company. Vizio also manufactures its products in Mexico and China under agreements with 
ODM assemblers in those countries.”  
LG was originally established in 1958 as GoldStar, producing radios, TVs, refrigerators, washing 
machines, and air conditioners. In 1999 LG acquired 100% of the bankrupt US Zenith, having purchased 
a 50% interest in 1995. Zenith at the time had over 900 issued US patents. Although the patents strongly 
emphasized about-to-be-obsoleted analog and CRT-based18,19 television and related technologies, it also 
included valuable patents on vestigial sideband modulation which were essential to emerging digital TV 
standards. Royalties of $5 per TV set resulted in total payments of $25M in 2006 and $50M in 2007 and 
still are continuing.20
I believe that LG saw that Samsung’s “invest, pay royalties, develop internal technology, invest some 
more” would work and – possibly also backed by the government
 What the Zenith purchase also provided, in addition to a competent engineering 
team (even now generating patents for LG), was a brand that still appealed to a US consumer. 
21
second-largest television manufacturer
 or, at least, the chaebols -- saw an 
opening and moved aggressively. Unlike Samsung, LG Display has been listed on the NYSE since 2004, 
but well after it had started investing in LCD fabs. Already by 1998, four years after LG’s first CD-ROM 
drive, LG had achieved worldwide #1 ranking in sales of CD-ROMs – yet another technology dominated 
by third party patents -- and is now the world's  (after 
Samsung),[2] and the world's fifth-largest mobile phone maker by unit sales since the second quarter of 
2012.  
In comparison with Japanese makers, the Koreans had the advantage of lower labor costs (even if they 
initially had to buy their manufacturing tools from Japan), lower cost of capital, and little need to 
conform to Wall Street investment measurements. In retrospect, it is not hard to see the logic of their 
approach even if they now are close to the bind originally faced by the CRT TV makers. There is industry 
over-capacity, profit margins are fading, and – as the LCD technology becomes commoditized – lower 
cost Chinese (and other Asian) newcomers are undercutting the leaders on cost and price. As we see 
from the technology literature, the reaction is to search for new technologies, like organic light emitting 
                                                          
16 They (separately) sold their know-how to different Taiwanese display makers. 
17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vizio  
18 “Zenith was acquired by LG… mostly for its DTV patents.” http://displaydaily.com/2012/01/30/last-one-out-please-turn-off-the-lights/  
19 Even their handful of “flat panel” applications covered CRT flat panel displays which still had some attractions to engineers who had been 
brought up on CRTs. 
20 LG Electronics 50-Year History vol. 04, English Edition (1958), p. 48. 
 
21The Korean government announced the electronic industry development plan in 1966 and, in 1969, the 'Electronic industry 8-year 
development project'. LG Electronics, 50-year History, VOL. 04 2008.English Edition  
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devices (OLEDs), quantum dots, LED backlights, three-D, ultra-resolution… Only time will tell if any of 
these initiatives can maintain the industry, or whether some still incipient replacement will come to 
dominate. 
It should not be surprising to note that Samsung and LG have followed the same path into leadership in 
sales of cell phones and smart phones, so that Samsung – using phones powered by Google’s Android – 
has become such a force that, in spite of a billion dollar jury damage award to Apple22, they are now the 
500 pound gorilla in the smart phone arena, Ranking number one in cell phone and smart phone sales 
since 2012. Samsung’s mobile initiative started rather late, in 1983, and its first successful handset didn’t 
ship until 1988. As in LCDs, they surged to a leadership position in spite of having a thin portfolio of 
relevant wireless patents, almost none of which were “standards essential”. LG has been less successful, 
but still achieved fifth ranking in worldwide handset unit sales.23
Patents and Success 
 Now, thanks to their broad and deep 
patent portfolios, they are in a strong defensive position, even when they choose to enter a new field, as 
few manufacturers would want to risk infringing a large number of Samsung’s or LG’s many thousands 
of patents. 
The development of the Samsung and LG portfolios of US patents parallels their technology 
development. LG first filed its two issued US patents in 1984. Six more issued from applications filed in 
1985 and 27 issued from applications filed in 1986. In 1987 LG filed for 95 later-issued US patents while 
Samsung, just getting started, had two patents issued from 1987 files, 26 filed in 1988 and 189 filed in 
1989 (passing LG’s 99). By 1990 both had high triple digit filings that later issued. In short, until 1988-
1989, neither LG nor Samsung was a significant patentee in the US (or anywhere else, except possibly in 
Korea). 
Patents and R&D investment are two popular proxy measurements for business success. However, they 
are hardly decisive. Patents and success are certainly correlated, but causality is not obvious. Microsoft 
was already a raging success before it earned its first twenty US patents, in 1995; its first (three!) US 
patent applications were only filed at the end of 1992. And Apple, that paragon of innovation, had 
received only a total of 61 US patents by 1990, when it had already achieved iconic “innovativeness” 
status. In contrast, IBM and AT&T had made patenting a key element in their development strategy, and 
they fed the patent process with leading R&D investments for decades. More recently, IBM has 
continued to lead in the number of US patents awarded for the last twenty years along with its 
continuing major R&D investments. Samsung, from a standing start has leapt to the forefront of patent 
recipients, ironically joining Canon, Sony, Matsushita, Toshiba and other Japanese brands in the top ten. 
Clearly, there is more to success than accumulating certificates from the US patent office. To borrow a 
metaphor from criminal law, a good patent attorney can get a patent on a ham sandwich. 
Apple offers yet another example of the limited value of using a patent portfolio as a predictor of 
success. In spite of its huge infringement win over Samsung, the Apple portfolio until very recently has 
                                                          
22 http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/08/24/jury-reaches-verdict-in-apple-vs-samsung-case/ 
23 http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2335616  
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been unimpressive, numbering less than 100 patents per year (in comparison with Samsung’s and LG’s – 
and Canon’s, Sony’s and Toshiba’s – thousands). In addition to the royalties it may (but doesn’t 
automatically) generate24
Nevertheless, it only takes one really good patent to make a company, or a university, or an individual 
inventor rich. For example, one patent  - US3,789,832, Apparatus and method for detecting cancer in 
tissue, issued 2-5-1974, filed 3-17-1972, by Raymond Damadian – underlies the entire MRI imaging 
industry. 
, a strong patent portfolio serves to insulate the company’s products from 
infringement suits by providing the currency for cross licenses. However, as we have seen in the above 
discussion, a company determined to compete can buy its way in if it has enough ready money to pay 
for licenses and to invest in the R&D needed to generate its own patents. See the Appendix for a table 
comparing the leading recipients of US patents over the last 20 years. 
Other Possible Success Factors 
R&D investment, while a somewhat better indicator of future success, often fails, as well. Consider the 
dot-com billionaires whose R&D was carried out in a dorm room. This is consistent with the intuitive 
feeling, confirmed by data, that patents and R&D are closely correlated, while the number of patents 
and industrial success are less so.25
Another argument often advanced relates to the availability of low cost labor. Indeed, that was an early 
rationale for IBM building its presence in Japan in the 1970’s and 80’s (obviously before the great 
Japanese bubble). It is still an obvious factor in the dominance of Chinese contract manufacturers such 
as Foxconn, as well as the US-based Flextronics which does most of its contract assembly in China. 
Nevertheless, the fields in which Samsung and LG have carved out leadership – DRAMs, hard disks, 
smart phones and LCDs – are capital intensive industries, with much of the production performed in 
automated factories, now costing billions of dollars each. These are products where the cost of capital is 
far more significant than the cost of labor.  
  
As noted earlier, even in the mid-nineties the cost of a competitive TFT-LCD manufacturing facility was 
approaching several billion USD. Five years ago it was already $3B26 and is now more than twice that as 
the size of the glass processed has grown.  As J.P. Morgan is said to have replied when questioned about 
the cost of a yacht, “If you have to ask the price, you can’t afford it.”27 Since the Korean government 
controlled access to capital28
                                                          
24 IBM’s income from its patent portfolio has been as high as $1.5B, and still exceeds $1B. 
, much as Japan had done earlier, it is likely that the government copied the 
successful Japanese industrial policy by enabling access to low cost capital for Samsung and LG, 
25 Applied Econometrics and International Development. AEID.Vol. 5 4 (2005), PRODAN, Igor 
INFLUENCE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES ON NUMBER OF PATENT APPLICATIONS: SELECTED CASE 
STUDIES IN OECD COUNTRIES AND CENTRAL EUROPE, 1981-2001 
26 Craig Addison, SEMI Dazzling Display Issues: LCD Market Growth, Glass Size, Fab Cost, and OLEDs, 
http://www.semi.org/en/P044084   
 
27 Business Education World, Vol. 42. Gregg Publishing Company. 1961. p. 32. 
28 See, for example, Kang-Kook Lee (Ritsumeikan University),  Economic Growth Controlling Capital: focusing on the 1960s’ experience in Korea, 
www.ritsumei.ac.jp/~leekk/study/lee-ko60cc-ss.doc  
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providing them with a significant competitive advantage. Moreover, these were not public companies 
while they were aggressively building up their manufacturing capacity, so they were not troubled by 
Wall Street’s fixation on return on capital. They could afford to focus on the numerator, and ignore the 
denominator. So, although we must look elsewhere than to labor cost for factors that have led to the 
success of Samsung and, in a lesser way, LG, the cost and availability of capital are an important factor in 
their success in comparison with their fading Japanese competitors. And, as a colleague of mine 
reminded me, we have to look fast before other unknowns rise up and knock today’s leaders off their 
pedestals. 
What Happened to the Japanese Makers?  
The Japanese consumer electronics giants do not appear to have made egregious errors. After the Plaza 
Accords bubble burst in the 1990’s, they were victims of a high yen and a deflationary economy, limiting 
their ability to invest and export. In a narrow sense, they also paid a penalty for being too early with 
innovation: Japan’s national broadcasting company NHK led the world with satellite and high definition 
TV broadcasts into the 1990’s. It’s possible that this nascent leadership opportunity led the Japanese 
makers astray by their need to concentrate on analog technology in order to satisfy their domestic 
market, thus missing the tide favoring digital TV, so astutely exploited by LG in its purchase of Zenith. 
Another misstep was costly investments in plasma TV, notably by Panasonic (Matsushita) but that didn’t 
seem to have troubled Samsung and LG.  
The TV makers continued to invest in R&D and pile up patents and even to invest in bigger and bigger 
fabs until fairly recently. And, as noted above, they may not have had access to the low cost capital 
available in Korea, greatly limiting their ability to invest profitably in building new LCD fabs. Finally, no 
one would argue that Korean engineers were smarter than Japanese engineers but it seems likely that 
they worked harder and longer in a nationalistic drive to outdo their former colonial masters.  
One last possible source of the Japanese loss of leadership would be in the executive suites, where 
Korean management appears to have been much less risk averse. An exploration of this possibility is 
beyond the scope of this brief analysis. 
The Verdict  
Samsung and LG appear to have been the beneficiaries of shrewd industrial policies of the South Korean 
government and superior senior management choices coupled with the determination of their staff, 
somewhat enhanced by misjudgments by Japanese TV consumer electronics makers’ top management. 
 
  








    
 IBM30 Samsung  LG31   Matsushita Canon Sony Toshiba Hitachi Panasonic Apple Microsoft Intel 
2012 6478 5081 3101   3174 3032 2447  2769 1303 2613  
2011 6148 4968 2873  2533 2818 2265 2451 1455  825 2309  
2010 5866 4518 2763  2443 2551 2130 2212   741 3086 1652 
2009 4887 3592 2014  1759 2200 1656 1669   416 2901 1534 
2008 4169 3502 1720  1469 2107 1461 1575   272 2026 1772 
2007 3125 2723 1456  1910 1983 1455 1519   166 1637 1864 
2006 3621 2451 1364  2229 2366 1771 1672 1732  141  1959 
2005 2941 1641 975  1688 1828  1258 1271  104  1549 
2004 3248 1604 1012  1934 1805 1305 1310 1514  133  1601 
2003 3415 1313 779  1786 1992 1311  1893  108  1592 
2002 3288 1328 655  1544 1893 1434  1601  101   
2001 3411 1450 496  1440 1877 1363  1271  117   
2000 2886 1441 579   1890 1385 1232   136   
1999 2756 1545 650   1795 1410 1200   189   
1998 2657 1304 576   1928 1316 1170 1094  268   
1997 1724 731 411   1381 859 862 903  236   
1996  591 323        188   
1995  504 298        138   
1994  486 252 33 Zenith       78   
1993  435 175 All but 129 Zenith      78   
1992  305 156 All but 95 
Zenith 
      56   
1991  205 135 All but 77 
Zenith 
      42   
1990  82 126 All but 67 
Zenith 
      38   
1989  47 96 All but 36 
Zenith 
      12   
1988  15 119 All but 39 
Zenith 
      13   
1987  11 111 All but 18 
Zenith 
      12   
1986  9 70 Zenith       10   
1985  3 59 Zenith        6   
1980-1984  277 Zenith          
             
             
 
                       
                         
 
                                                          
29 Note that not all primary sources agree! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_top_United_States_patent_recipients  
30 For 2012 data, see http://www.lotempiolaw.com/2013/02/articles/patents/top-10-companies-issued-us-patents-in-2012    
31 www.delphion.com tabulated by the author 
